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NASA'S COMMERCIAL CREW TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND 
THE FAA HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT REGULATIONS: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS? 
Mark J. Sundahl 
Cleveland State University 
United States 
mark.sundahl@law.csuohio.edu 
On December 10, 2010, NASA issued the second version of the technical requirements that will be 
imposed on private companies that provide orbital crew transportation services to NASA. These 
Commercial Crew Transportation System Requirements for NASA Low Earth Orbit Missions impose a 
multitude of operational and design requirements that, among other things, extend many existing NASA 
technical requirements to private service providers. The sheer volume of these requirements is daunting -
being composed of thousands of pages requirements, guidelines, and best practices on various areas from 
crew health and safety to power systems, wiring, and orbital debris mitigation. This approach to regulating 
private spaceflight companies stands in stark contrast to the Federal Aviation Administration's Human 
Space Flight Requirements which take a "hands off' approach to regulating private suborbital human 
spaceflight by imposing few technical requirements - opting instead to protect private passengers by 
requiring companies to fully disclose the risks of spaceflight. This approach has the result of both 
promoting innovation as well as protecting the consumer since spaceflight companies are free to innovate 
without having to comply with complex design and operational requirements, while private passengers are 
able to make a fully informed decision when taking on the risk of suborbital flight. After first comparing 
the different approaches taken in these two sets of regulations, this paper considers ( 1) whether the more 
onerous NASA requirements are necessitated by the different nature of orbital spaceflight related to a 
government program (in contrast to private suborbital spaceflight), (2) the likely effects of the NASA 
requirements on commercial innovation, and (3) whether NASA (and other space agencies) should adopt 
another model of regulation governing the engagement of private orbital service providers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Commercial human spaceflight is now 
emerging on multiple fronts. Space tourism 
companies will soon be sending their first 
passengers into suborbital space. Bigelow 
Aerospace and Excalibur Almaz are planning to 
place private space stations in orbit. And due to 
the recent retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet, 1 
the United States will soon be relying on private 
companies to deliver crew to the International 
Space Station ("ISS"). NASA currently has no 
means of delivering crew and cargo to the 
International Space Station and must purchase 
transport service from Russia, which will cost 
the United States approximately sixty million 
dollars for each astronaut delivered to and from 
1 The Space Shuttle program ended on July 21, 2011, 
when the Space Shuttle Atlantis completed its last 
mission. See Ned Porter, Space Shuttle Atlantis Makes 
Historic Final Landing, Ends 30-year Program, ABC 






In response to the advent of commercial 
human spaceflight, the Federal Aviation 
Administration ("FAA") issued the Human 
Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space 
Flight Participants ("FAA Requirements") in 
2006 pursuant to the Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act of 2004.3 In 2010, Congress 
enacted the NASA Authorization Act which 
authorized NASA to contract with private 
companies with the intent to purchase 
commercial crew space transportation services to 
2 NASA has already purchased 46 seats aboard the 
Soyuz spacecraft for flights through 2015 in order to 
provide for crew transportation needs while private 
companies develop the capability to deliver astronauts 
to the space station. See National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, Audit Report, NASA's 
CHALLENGES CERTIFYING AND ACQUIRING 
COMMERCIAL CREW TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, 
Report. No. IG-11-022 (Assignment No. A-10-010-
00) (June 30, 2011) at 13-14, [hereinafter, Audit 
Report]. 
3 Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and 
Space Flight Participants, 14 C.F.R. Parts 401, 415, 
431, 435, 440 and 460; Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act of2004, 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70305. 
low earth orbit ("LEO") and the ISS.4 Soon 
thereafter, on December 8, 2010, NASA issued 
the Commercial Crew Transportation System 
Certification Requirements for NASA Low Earth 
Orbit Missions (the "NASA Requirements") 
which set forth health and medical, engineering, 
and safety and mission assurance requirements 
that must be met by private companies that will 
provide crew delivery services for NASA. 5 
The two sets of requirements, one from the 
FAA and one from NASA, create the framework 
of regulations under which the new spaceflight 
companies must operate. The regulatory 
environment of any industry is always a critical 
factor in the development of that industry. And 
the nature of that regulatory environment is 
particularly important when the industry is in its 
early and fragile stages - as is the case for the 
human spaceflight industry. The new space 
companies face a multitude of challenges that 
range from the technical to the financial. 
Regulatory burdens also exist, such as the 
futernational Traffic in Arms Regulations which 
subject space technology to the same stringent 
controls that govern munitions. 6 The nature of 
the requirements issued by the FAA and NASA 
will have a considerable impact on this emerging 
industry. However, whether the requirements 
will prove to support the growth of the industry 
by promoting innovation or will result in 
harming the industry - by not allowing sufficient 
flexibility for innovation - will only become 
clear in the coming years. At this point, 
however, we are presented with two models of 
regulation that, at least at first glance, appear to 
4 According to this statute, private companies must 
comply with NASA-specified certification process to 
show that their equipment meets the agency's safety 
requirements. 
5 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Commercial Crew Transportation System 
Certification Requirements for NASA Low Earth Orbit 
Missions, Doc. No.ESMD-CCTSCR-12.10 (Dec. 8, 
2010), at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/504982main_ 
CCTSCR_Dec-OB_Basic_ Web.pdf [hereinafter, 
CCTSCR]. NASA uses the term "human rating" only 
with respect to NASA vehicles to describe a vehicle as 
worthy of transporting humans. Stephen Clark, 
'Human rating' document hits the Web with new 
name, SPACEFLIGHf Now (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://spaceflightnow.com/newslnl 012/l 6humanrating 
In contrast, NASA will "certify" vehicles and systems 
produced by commercial partners when they are used 
to transport NASA astronauts. CCTSCR, supra note 5, 
at4. 
6 See, e.g., Mark J. Sundahl, Space Tourism and 
Export Controls: A Prayer for Relief, 75 J. Air Law & 
Commerce 581 (2010). 
151 
be quite different. While the FAA takes a 
"hands-off' approach by requiring very little of 
the space companies with respect to the design 
and operation of their spacecraft, NASA appears 
to take a much more aggressive approach by 
creating imposing design and operation 
requirements that run into thousands of pages 
This paper compares these two sets of 
requirements and evaluates the benefits and 
disadvantages of the two models. 
II. THE FAA REQUIREMENTS 
The FAA Requirements have been amply 
described by other commentators, and so this 
section will only provide a brief summary of the 
regulations in addition to a brief evaluation of 
the approach taken by the FAA. 7 
The FAA Requirements require that a 
license be procured by a space vehicle operator 
intending to launch (or reenter) a vehicle 
containing passengers (or "space flight 
participants"). In order to obtain the license and 
commence launch activity, the operator must 
comply with a number of provisions contained in 
the FAA Requirements. These requirements 
include (i) showing financial responsibility, (ii) 
obtaining reciprocal waiver of claims, (iii) 
complying with certain minimum operational 
requirements, (iv) crew training, (v) fully 
disclosing the risks of flight to prospective space 
flight participants, and (vi) obtaining the 
informed written consent of space flight 
participants. 
The requirements for showing financial 
responsibility and executing reciprocal waivers 
address liability concerns and the ability of an 
operator to meet its obligations in the event of an 
anomaly. The other requirements are designed 
to help ensure the safety of those on the ground 
(as well as those on-board). However, rather 
than prescribe detailed design requirements, the 
FAA decided to require only certain minimum 
operations requirements and full disclosure of 
risks to space flight participants. For example, 
an operator is required to "provide atmospheric 
7 A general description of the FAA Requirements can 
be found in Tracey Knutson, What is 'Informed 
Consent' For Space Flight Participants in the Soon-
To-l.aunch Space Tourism Industry? 33 J. Space L. 
1 OS (2007); Stephan Robe, Legal Aspects of Space 
Tourism, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 439 (2007); Kenneth Wong, 
Developing Commercial Human Space-Flight 
Regulations, in Space Safety Regulations and 
Standards (ed. Pelton & Jakhu 2010); Catherine E. 
Parsons, Space Tourism: Regulating Passage to the 
Happiest Place Off Earth, 9 Chap. L. Rev. 493 (2006). 
conditions adequate to sustain life and 
consciousness for all inhabited areas with a 
vehicle."8 How this requirement is achieved is 
left to the operator. Congress only granted the 
FAA the authority to prohibit design features 
that have resulted in a serious or fatal injury, or 
that may contribute to events that pose a high 
risk of causing a serious or fatal injury.9 The 
crew training requirements are also minimal in 
nature. For example, the pilot must (in addition 
to having an FAA pilot certificate with an 
instrument rating) possess "skills necessary to 
pilot and control the vehicle."10 How the pilot 
acquires these skills is left largely open. 
The FAA's approach has been heralded as a 
"hands-off' approach to regulating human space 
flight that enables operators the greatest possible 
freedom to innovate with respect to spacecraft 
design. Congress, in passing the CSLA, 
understood that prescribing design requirements 
would stifle innovation - after all, we do not 
want private operators simply to simply repeat 
what NASA has done, but to instead develop 
new spaceflight technologies that NASA have 
not yet contemplated. 
This is not to say that the FAA has neglected 
the safety of the space flight participant. 
However, rather than certifying a spacecraft as 
"safe", the FAA instead addresses the issue of 
safety risk by requiring full disclosure of the 
risks to all space flight participants. In addition 
to having to provide, in writing, a description of 
the risks of space flight, the operator must give 
the prospective passenger the opportunity to 
request additional information both in writing 
and by means of an oral question and answer 
session. The passenger is then required to sign a 
written consent to participate in the flight. 11 
In short, Congress and the FAA resisted the 
risk of over-regulating the nascent human 
spaceflight industry by keeping the 
technical/training requirements to a minimum, 
while still protecting the public by ensuring that 
passengers will enter a spacecraft by their own 
choice after being made fully aware of the risks 
involved. The limited nature of the FAA 
regulations can also be seen in the length of the 
regulations which run only 14 pages in length, 
much of this space being dedicated to the model 
reciprocal waiver agreements. 
8 Id. §460.ll(a). 
9 49 U.S.C. §70105(c)(2). 
10 14 C.F.R. §460.5(a). 
11 Id. §460.45. 
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III. THE NASA REQUIREMENTS 
The feature of the NASA Requirements that 
distinguishes them most sharply from the FAA 
Requirements is their volume. In contrast to the 
14 pages of the FAA Requirements, the NASA 
Requirements are composed of thousands of 
pages. Moreover, unlike the FAA Requirements, 
the NASA Requirements address design issues in 
great detail. It would appear from these facts 
that NASA has taken a heavy hand in its 
approach to commercial providers and will 
micro-manage the design and operation of 
private spacecraft to a degree that will prevent 
the type of innovation fostered by the FAA 
Requirements. Whether this is truly the case 
requires a closer examination of the NASA 
Requirements. 
III.I. Background 
In its long history of human spaceflight, 
NASA has never utilized the services of a private 
company to transport its astronauts. 12 As NASA 
ventures into this new paradigm of crew 
transportation, the main challenge for the agency 
will be ensuring the safety of its astronauts and 
success of its missions while at the same time 
giving private service providers the freedom to 
develop new technologies that will meet 
NASA's standards.13 NASA does not currently 
require human rating for vehicles that are not 
developed by NASA. 14 However, as outlined in 
NASA's General Safety Program 
Requirements, 15 when using commercial vehicles 
to carry NASA crew members, NASA must 
carefully monitor any risks that commercial 
vehicles pose to crew members and require its 
commercial partners to adhere to necessary 
safety measures. 16 These safety measures are 
contained in the NASA Requirements and are 
based on NASA's Human Rating Requirements 
for Space Systems.17 
12 Audit Report, supra note 2, at i. 
13 Id. 
14 See CCTSCR. supra note 5, at 4. 
15 NASA General Safety Program Requirements, NPR 
8715.3C, paragraph 1/14 (March 12, 2008), 
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfin?t=NPR&c 
=8715&s=3C. 
16 See CCTSCR, supra note 5, at 4. 
17 HUMAN-RATING REQUIREMENTS FOR SPACE 
SYSTEMS, NASA Doc. No. NPR 8705.2 (May 6, 
2008), at http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/display 
Dir.cfin?t=NPR&c=8705&s=2B. Note, however, that 
the Russian Soyuz vehicle has not obtained a NASA 
human-rating certification even though it carries 
In Section 403(b)(l) of the NASA 
Authorization Act, Congress authorized NASA 
to create the Commercial Crew Transportation 
Certification Requirements, as reproduced 
here: 18 
Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the 
Administrator shall develop and make 
available to the public detailed human 
rating processes and requirements to 
guide the design of commercially-
developed crew transportation 
capabilities, which requirements shall 
be at least equivalent to proven 
requirements for crew transportation in 
use as of the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 19 
As a result, NASA was not only given the 
power to set safety standards, but also to enforce 
those safety standards. 20 Section 50111 of the 
United States Code states that "if a commercial 
provider demonstrates the capability to satisfy 
certain ascent, entry, and ISS proximity 
operations safety requirements," then NASA will 
enter into an "ISS crew transfer and crew rescue 
services contract with that commercial provider 
through calendar year 2016, with an option to 
extend the period of performance through 
calendar year 2020."21 Congress also directs 
NASA to use commercially provided ISS "crew 
transfer and crew rescue services to the 
maximum extent practicable, if those 
commercial services have demonstrated the 
capability to meet" NASA-prescribed safety 
requirements, and NASA must do it by means of 
"facilitat[ion], to the maximum extent 
NASA astronauts. See Audit Report, supra note 2, 2 
n.14. Due to its successful operational history and 
demonstrated level of reliability and safety, NASA 
deemed the Soyuz safe for U.S. crews. Id. 
18 NASA Authorization Act of Oct. 11, 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111 - 267, §403(b)(l), 39. 
19 Id. 
20 51 u.s.c. §50132 (b). 
21 Id. §5011 l(b)(4). Congressional findings include the 
statements that commercial activities of private sector 
have substantially contributed to the strengths of both 
the United States space program and the national 
economy, and that the Federal Government should 
purchase space goods and services whenever such 
goods and services meet Government mission 
requirements in a cost-effective manner. Pub. L. 102-
588, title V, § 502, (Nov. 4, 1992), 106 Stat. 5123. 
153 
practicable, the transfer of'' NASA-developed 
technologies to potential commercial providers.22 
At the same time, Congress intends to 
provide commercial partners with maximum 
flexibility in their technological innovations by 
seeking ongoing removal of legal, policy, and 
institutional impediments to space commerce.23 
Congressional findings state that the provision of 
launch services by the private sector is 
"consistent with the national security and foreign 
policy interests of the nation and would be 
facilitated by stable, minimal, and appropriate 
regulatory guidelines that are fairly and 
expeditiously applied."24 Congress recognizes 
that the regulatory standards governing human 
space flight must evolve as the industry matures 
so that "regulations neither stifle technology 
development nor expose crew or space flight 
participants to avoidable risks as the public 
comes to expect greater safety from the 
industry. "25 
III.II. The Nature of the NASA Requirements 
The core of the NASA Requirements is a 
39-page document that describes the process of 
certifying private companies for NASA missions 
and sets forth the certification requirements. The 
requirements contained in this document 
reference, in turn, further requirements and 
standards found in other NASA documents. The 
main body of this core document consists of 
three main sections: (1) the CCTS Operational 
and Design Certification Technical 
Requirements, which describes NASA's general 
expectations for system safety, human control of 
the vehicle, and crew survival; (2) the Technical 
Authority Mandatory Standards and 
Requirements, which list 93 documents, each 
containing additional requirements companies 
must meet in order to obtain certification; and (3) 
the CCTS Certification Package, which sets forth 
the content and timing for each of the plans, 
documents and other materials which are to be 
delivered by commercial companies to NASA to 
22 51 U.S.C. §50111(b)(l)(A), (C). 
23 Id. §50702( d)(7). Chapter 507 of the Title 51 
establishes the Office of Space Commercialization 
within the Department of Commerce, and the main 
function of the office is the coordination of the space 
related issues, programs and initiatives within the 
Department of Commerce. One of the duties of its 
director includes the removal of legal, policy, and 
institutional impediments to space commerce. Id. 
24 Id. §50901(a) (emphasis added). 
25 Id. (emphasis added). 
show compliance throughout the different 
certification stages (or "milestones"). 
The NASA Requirements state that "[t]he 
applicable revision of documents listed shall be 
the current revision in effect on the date of the 
agreement or contract," which means that 
commercial partners only need to comply with 
the version of the NASA Requirements that is in 
effect at the time of contracting, but the 
requirements shall be revised periodically.26 
III.II.A. The CCTS Operational and Design 
Certification Technical Reguirements 
The Operational and Design Certification 
Technical Requirements are divided into the 
following five categories: 
(I) System Safety 
(2) System Control Requirements in General 
( 3) System Control Requirements for 
Spacecraft 
( 4) System Control Requirements for Proximity 
Operations 
(5) Crew Survival/Aborts 
These five categories contain a total of 31 
requirements, each of which includes a 
"Rationale" section describing the intent and 
reasoning for the requirement. These 
requirements are not necessarily the only 
requirements that must be met before a private 
company can perform a NASA mission. NASA 
reserves the right to tailor the requirements and 
impose additional requirements as needed for a 
particular mission.27 
Many of these requirements are abstract in 
nature, thus leaving the mechanism for meeting 
the requirements open to the ingenuity of the 
private company.28 For example, the System 
Safety Requirements include standards requiring 
that the spacecraft should provide a safe and 
habitable crew environment, 29 have failure 
tolerance to avoid catastrophic events,30 be 
designed to overcome instances of human 
26 See CCTSCR, supra note 5, at 22 (emphasis added). 
NASA's Commercial Crew Program Planning Office 
is also developing but has not finalized the processes 
NASA will use to verify that these requirements have 
been met and to certify that a commercial partner's 
vehicle is capable of safely transporting Agency 
~ersonnel. See Audit Report, supra note 2, at 7. 
7 CCTSCR, supra note 5, at 12. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 13. 
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error.31 Along the same lines, the Crew 
Survival/Abort Requirements demand that the 
private spacecraft have the ability to evacuate the 
craft unassisted, both on the launch pad and after 
landing, and to execute an abort during ascent on 
computer, crew and ground commands.32 Once 
again, how these requirements are met are left to 
the creative problem-solving capabilities of the 
commercial partner. 
III.Il.B. The Technical Authority Mandatory 
Standards and Reguirements 
The Technical Authority Mandatory 
Standards and Requirements (the "TA 
Requirements") contain the bulk of the 
requirements that must be met by private 
companies performing NASA LEO missions.33 
The TA Requirements reference 93 additional 
NASA documents, each containing further 
requirements companies must meet in order to 
obtain certification. Altogether, these 93 
documents contain more than 4,000 
requirements. 34 
NASA has categorized the underlying 93 
documents by subject matter and by level of 
compliance. The documents are subdivided by 
subject matter into three subject matter 
categories: 
(1) Mandatory Health and Medical Technical 
Authority Requirements (6 documents), 
which focus on health, safety, and 
environmental standards,.35 
(2) Mandatory Engineering Technical Authority 
Requirements (42 documents), which 
contain design standards..36 and 
(3) Mandatory Safety and Mission Assurance 
("SMA") Technical Authority Requirements 
( 45 documents), which contain safety 
requirements of both a general and specific 
nature.37 
31 Id. at 15. 
32 Id. at 19-21. 
33 CCTSCR, supra note 5, at 22. 
34 See Audit Report, supra note 2, at 9. 
35See, e.g., NASA Space Flight Human System 
Standard Volume 1: Crew Health, Doc. No. NASA-
STD-300l(March 5, 2007). 
36See, e.g., Fracture Control Requirements for 
Sfacejlight Hardware, Doc. No. NASA-SID-5019. 
3 See, e.g., NASA General Program Requirements, 
Doc. No. NPR 8715.3, as an example of a general 
requirements document; and see Fiber Optic 
Termination, Cable Assemblies, and Installation, Doc. 
Within each of these three subject matter 
categories, the same 93 referenced documents 
are further subdivided into three levels of 
compliance: Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 
documents. 
Type 1 documents contain requirements that 
must be strictly complied with by NASA's 
commercial partners.38 There are only five Type 
1 documents listed, and those five documents are 
all in the category of Mandatory Health and 
Medical TA Requirements. However, only three 
out of those five documents must currently be 
complied with because two of the Type l 
documents, 'Man-Systems Integration 
Standards' and 'Human Factors Design 
Standard', have been superseded by 'NASA 
Spaceflight Human System Standard' Volumes l 
and 2 (which are two of the three Type l 
documents in effect).39 The total length of the 
three documents combined is 487 pages. There 
are no Type 1 documents in the second and the 
third subject matter categories. 
Type 2 documents contain requirements that 
the commercial partner can either comply with 
strictly or else propose an alternative, which 
must then be approved by NASA Technical 
Authorities. 40 There are 70 Type 2 documents. 
Out of the 70 documents, 53 are currently fully 
available to the general public, and the total 
length of those 53 documents combined is 3380 
pages. Any document that is referenced by a 
Type l document should be treated as a Type 2 
document unless otherwise indicated.41 
Type 3 documents describe "best practices" 
developed by NASA in its experience with 
human space flight.42 These documents are 
intended to be used as reference sources for 
companies as they develop their technology and 
No. NASA-STD 8739.5, as an example of a specific 
requirements document. 
38 CCTSCR supra note 5, at 22. See, e.g., NASA Doc. 
No. NPR 8705.2B, §l.4.4. as an example of both a 
Type 1 document within Mandatory Health and 
Medical TA Requirements; see also NASA Space 
Flight Human System Standard Volume 2: Human 
Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, Doc. 
No. NASA-STD-3001, Vol. 2, (Jan.10, 2011). The 
mandatory requirements themselves set out by these 
documents are very specific, stating for example that 
the humidity must be of a certain level. 
39 Id. Table 6-1: Type l Health and Medical TA 
documents, at 23. 




do not contain any requirements per se.43 There 
are 18 Type 3 documents, with l 0 documents 
being fully available to the general public. The 
total length of the available documents combined 
is 2245 pages. 
III.11.C. The 1100-Series Documents 
When a private company intends to deliver 
NASA crew members to the ISS, the company 
must comply with the 1100-Series documents in 
addition to the NASA Requirements.44 
Compliance with the 1100-Series must be shown 
through the same Certification Package delivered 
to show compliance with the NASA 
Requirements. 45 
The 1100-Series is comprised of six 
documents. The first document, entitled "Crew 
Transportation Plan", describes the roles of 
NASA and the commercial partners and the 
requirements for achieving certification to 
transport crew members to the ISS.46 The 
second document, entitled "Crew Transportation 
System Design Reference Missions", states the 
design goals for a spacecraft delivering crew to 
LEO. The third document, entitled "Crew 
Transportation Technical Management Process", 
summarizes the processes that NASA considers 
critical to a successful mission. The fourth 
document, entitled "ISS Crew Transportation 
and Services Requirements", describes the nature 
of the service requirements demanded by NASA. 
The fifth document, entitled "Crew 
Transportation Technical Standards and Design 
Evaluation Criteria", sets forth critical design 
specifications, standards, and processes and 
explains the criteria NASA will use to assess 
commercial systems. Finally, the sixth 
document, entitled "Crew Transportation 
Operations Standards'', sets forth the minimum 
criteria and practices for commercial space flight 
partners. The Crew Transportation Technical 
Management Processes document and the Crew 
Transportation Operations Standard Guidelines 
document are not currently available to the 
general public online. The other four publicly 
available 1100-Series documents collectively run 
380 pages. 
43 Id.; see also id. Table 6-3 at 24, Table 6-6 at 27, 
Table 6-9 at 32. 
44 Audit Report, supra note 2, at ii. 
45 Id. at 9-10. 
46 Id. 
ill.ill. The CCTS Certification Package 
Commercial companies need to deliver a so-
called "Certification Package" to show 
compliance with the NASA Requirements.47 All 
the materials in the package will "collectively 
illustrate that the system has met the technical 
requirements and is safe to carry NASA 
crewmembers."48 There are 24 required items, 
which are marked as a one-time item or as initial 
release of item with required updates, to be 
provided upon one or more of the following 
milestones: System Requirements Review, 
System Definition Review, Preliminary Design 
Review, Critical Design Review, and 
Operational Readiness Review.49 At each of the 
major milestones, the Certification Package 
contents must be reviewed and approved by the 
Program Manager, Technical Authorities and the 
Johnson Space Center Director.50 In order to 
track the progress of the private company, the 
Certification Package must be maintained under 
"configuration management."51 Just prior to the 
launch of the mission, the Certification Package 
must be submitted for approval to the NASA 
Associate Administrator who serves as chair of 
the Agency Program Management Council. 52 
IV. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION 
After this review of the NASA 
Requirements, I have realized that despite their 
terrific volume they are, in fact, quite flexible 
and may allow companies sufficient room to still 
innovate freely. There is no denying that 
showing compliance with the many requirements 
is burdensome. But the many guidelines, 
standards, and best practices also provide a 
wealth of information that will undoubtedly 
facilitate the development of a safe and reliable 
spacecraft. In the best light, one could say that 
NASA has released the source code for 
designing a spacecraft and allows companies to 
either use the code (by following the 
requirements strictly) or else to make 
47 Id. at 8. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. Table 4-1 CCTS Certification Package Content. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. Configuration management is a process through 
which a system overall performance can be monitored 
to ensure consistency with program requirements. 
NASA, Intelligent System Division, 
http:llti.arc.nasa.govlsoftwarelsoftware-management 
lhandbook/cmmi/configuration-management (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2011 ). 
52 CCTSCR, supra note 5, at 8. 
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refinements to the source code (by proposing an 
alternative solution). 
On the other hand, I fear that the mere mass 
of requirements - which embody 50-year history 
of human spaceflight technology - will suffocate 
innovation. These requirements reflect the 
NASA's experience with the Mercury, Gemini, 
Apollo and Shuttle programs - and the ghosts of 
these programs can be felt. To create a new 
spacecraft with a new approach to the challenges 
of spaceflight may turn out to be difficult in the 
byzantine mass of requirements (no matter how 
elastic these requirements may be by allowing 
for alternative solutions) and under the looming 
shadows of these historic spaceflight programs. 
The fact that most of the NASA Requirements 
do not require strict compliance shows a desire 
on the part of NASA to be flexible and promote 
innovation among their commercial partners. 
However, at some point proving alternative 
solutions (under the Type 2 requirements) for 
more than a limited number of the requirements 
may prove to be too great a burden for a small 
and entrepreneurial company. This flies in the 
face of NASA's statements that it aspires to 
minimize regulatory burdens and facilitate 
innovation. 
Some might argue that comparing the FAA 
Requirements and the NASA Requirements is 
inappropriate. After all, the FAA Requirements 
apply to private passengers who choose to accept 
the risks of commercial spaceflight, while NASA 
is purchasing crew delivery services from a 
company. NASA would be placing the safety of 
its astronauts and the success of its mission in 
the hands of a private company - and therefore it 
should come as no surprise that NASA imposes 
broad requirements on these companies to ensure 
safety and achieve success. Of course, Congress 
limited the authority of the FAA to regulate, and 
so this, too, explains the limited nature of the 
FAA Requirements. 
But are these distinctions between the FAA 
Requirements and the NASA Requirements an 
acceptable justification for NASA's approach? I 
wonder whether innovation among private 
companies (innovation which would ultimately 
benefit NASA if the technology were truly 
revolutionary in a beneficial way) would be 
better served by a simpler set of requirements 
that only required the safe delivery and return of 
astronauts to LEO - perhaps with the 
requirement that such ability be proven by a 
series of flight tests. 
In the end, I think the contrasts between the 
FAA and NASA requirements are lighter than 
expected. Flexibility and freedom to explore and 
innovate are preserved. However, a question still 
remains regarding the effect of the many 
guidelines and standards that make up the NASA 
Requirements. Perhaps they will facilitate the 
development of the new generation of spacecraft. 
But I fear that the NASA Requirements will 
create the burden of having to comply with an 
unreasonable multitude of requirements and, as a 
result, stifle creativity. 
The author would like to thank Anna Brown 
and Beth Farrell for their research assistance in 
the writing of this paper. 
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